Estimations of BAAG
Some Estimations of BAAG Work in China
National Archives: WO 208/517.
From MI2 (March 1944)
“Intelligence of a high order”
“Of the highest importance to our intelligence work in the China Theatre”
“An indispensable intelligence link”
“A source of very valuable intelligence”
“One of our most valuable “I” links, keeping us informed on all manner of subjects about which we should otherwise know little”.
“The excellent work being done”
“A resumption of the full work of this intelligence organisation is of such importance to us that I consider the matter warrants representations being made to General Chiang Kai-shek”.
Australian War Memorial PR82/068.
From DMI, War Office, London. (Nov 1942)
“Much impressed your excellent work behalf escapees”
NA WO 208/420.
From C in C India. (23.4.43) [Field Marshal Wavell]
“[BAAG] providing useful intelligence especially of Security nature connected with INA and IIL and has definite political value, while without it Military escapees or ex-Government civilian employees would be left to fend for themselves in China with consequent damage to our reputation.
NA FO 371/46197
From C in C India (9.2.45) [Field Marshal Auchinleck]
“BAAG activities are definite contribution to Allied War effort against Japanese. Figures of the rescued to date and future possibilities confirm this. … BAAG Medical role has proved of inestimable value to generally existing relations with Chinese … Diminution BAAG activity will curtail flow of intelligence which has so far proved most useful and been particularly appreciated by Americans … excellent results attained to date …”
NA FO 371/46197
From SACSEA [Supreme Allied Command SE Asia] (02.05.45) [Admiral Lord Mountbatten]
“[General] Wedemeyer should be told that A) to date BAAG has assisted to safety 130 British and American subjects 350 Indians and thousands of Chinese. B) BAAG has gained the confidence and goodwill of inhabitants of Kwangsi and Kwangtung to a remarkable extent through the work of 1) establishment of hospitals for Chinese 2) distribution of food provided by the British Red Cross and the United China Relief and provision of rice for planting and famine relief generally 3) care of the dependants of Chinese of British birth now serving with the British forces in India or elsewhere. BAAG has been officially charged by British Government with responsibility for this task … these valuable services are vital to the British and those Chinese with whom the British have been in close relations …”.
NA FO 371/46197
From Military Attaché China (30.4.45) [General Hayes]
“… solid achievements of the organisation since its inception, its effect on morale of prisoners and our hope of what it might achieve as liberation day approaches. …”
NA HS 1/166 (SOE papers)
To SACSEA [Admiral Mountbatten] (13.11.44) [from Colin Mackenzie, head of SOE in Far East]
“… As an escape organisation BAAG has fully justified its formation. Apart from the additional security commitments imposed on the Japanese by its activities in this respect, … it renders considerable service to the USAAF operating in China, in helping their crashed air crews. GHQ India are of opinion that this assistance alone justifies a request for American help to meet the airlift required for maintenance. Intelligence provided by BAAG is, according to GHQ India, of the greatest importance in connection with the protection of the Indian Army, and of India as a base, from Japanese subversive efforts and espionage. BAAG also provides intelligence to the USAAF operating from China. SOE operations in SE China have been carried out through an SOE wing of BAAG, and SOE … are anxious to continue to work through BAAG in this area, and attach considerable importance to the maintenance of BAAG. If BAAG were withdrawn, SOE would have to start there from scratch. The Colonial Office also attach great importance to the maintenance of BAAG. It not only provides them with intelligence necessary for their planning, but through it they are organising the recruitment of former Chinese members of the Hongkong police and other departments whose services will be required when a British military administration is set up in Hongkong. … For the Chinese both BAAG and the Military Mission represent, in large measure, the British war effort in China. As such they have considerable political importance and play their part in the maintenance of Anglo-Chinese relations …”
AWM PR82/068
From Military Attaché, Chungking (27.10.44)
“… It is not too much to say that the BAAG has done more during the past three difficult years to raise British prestige in China than any other body or organisation … [you have kept] our various masters fed with a constant flow of valuable intelligence and maintained cordial relations with both our Chinese and American Allies. … you have been assisted by an amazingly good team … the good results which have been achieved are mainly due to the fact that they have worked as a team. But that they are a team and not just a collection of individuals is due to your own personality …”
AWM PR82/068
From GHQ India (4.10.44)
Referring to Ride’s offer to turn BAAG into a Long Range Penetration Group: “Offer of Commandant BAAG greatly valued here and reflects great credit on whole group in whom full confidence is placed and who have fully proved their value in intelligence. …”
NA WO 302/456
From MI2 (26.4.44)
“… we should profit from a visit from Colonel Ride BAAG. … Col. Ride’s experience in command of the BAAG will be of the greatest value to several branches of the War Office as well as to the Colonial Office and other ministries. The work of his Group is steadily increasing in importance and widening in scope, and it will be to the advantage of future operational and reconstructional planning for Hongkong that we should have first hand contact with him…”
NA WO 203/456
(Author and date unknown)
Heading: DRAFT. BRITISH ARMY AID GROUP, KWEILIN.
“…It has now been decided by India that the BAAG shall be used as a medium for political warfare directed against Indian elements in Hongkong, and it has been proposed that they should be used for the same work directed against all non-Japanese elements in Hongkong….”
AWM PR82/068
From DMI [Major General Cawthorn, GHQ India (17.2.44)
“… As was probably inevitable, the very nature of its [BAAG] organisation, its contacts, and the intelligence it had to acquire in order to perform its original function has resulted in the Aid Group growing into an all round intelligence organisation. Full recognition by the Chinese has afforded excellent facilities under cover of prisoner of war and internee rescue work to supply not only the American Air Force operating from bases in China, but also our own Naval intelligence with operational information of a highly valuable nature. These, however, are not the only services benefiting. Reports on commercial matters, enemy propaganda activities, and the suborning of Indian personnel for INA and IIL purposes are, additionally, all now flowing through the Headquarters of this Aid Group. The organisation has with much truth been likened to a funnel extending right into Japanese-occupied territory …”
NA WO 208/3498
Report on GSI(e) [BAAG] Work in China (author and date unknown)
“… Waichow: AHQ represent the only British Military post SE of Kweilin. Both government troops and guerrillas respect and co-operate with AHQ and by the medical relief work in the hospital and by a daily news service the foundation has been laid to a friendship and confidence without which no success would have been possible. The daily news sheet from Chungking is distributed in 11 copies in English and 60 in Chinese, all official and military HQ being on the mailing list. … If AHQ is to remain there, there can be no question of stopping the hospital. It must also be remembered too that when escapees arrive there they are in need of medical attention before they can proceed, and the work done for Chinese in that area produces gratitude which results in cooperation. AHQ is in a position to pass letters and medical stores into the camps. Contact has been established with Sham Shui Po and Argyle Street and recent news from the former suggests that their spirit is much higher and there is still some hope of escapees. For this contact to be broken with the camps would be a blow to the POW. The only SO operation carried out in China since the fall of Hongkong was done by AHQ (i.e. the sabotage to the wireless station). Agents recently planted in shipyards, factories and offices are just beginning to pass out information of value and with time the information will be of great value. Such agents in shipyards could well cooperate in sabotage …
“Kweilin: HQ is well situated here to despatch agents to Canton, Shanghai, Macao, and Kwangchowwan, and the increasingly good relations between the BAAG and the Chinese military and official authorities looks like producing profitable results. The Chinese authorities no longer regard the BAAG with suspicion and have “accepted” them. This may be regarded as a triumph for Col Ride and his staff.
HQ have gone on the policy of working the Hongkong and Canton areas as the staff was familiar with these towns; they were new to this kind of work but with the experience gained are now in a position to work other areas where there are PW. …
In general it may be said that GSI(e) which was started specifically in connection with PW, has developed into an organisation which covers practically every branch of intelligence - information about every side of the enemy’s activities (army, naval, air, and economic), deception, security, and censorship, besides providing information about the Chinese military activities and economic situation (and rackets) …
They have gradually become regarded in China as the right depository of all intelligence. This organisation has resulted in Ride getting the information about “Rudolf Hess” and in getting a long report out of Balankura; the latter was over a week in Chungking without any Britisher or American having been allowed to speak to or see him! Mr. Fletcher of MEW has assured me that Ride’s economic information is far the best he has read, the DIB value the security reports on persons from and in Hongkong, Mr. Davis of the SIS greatly appreciates the naval intelligence and the Americans have thought it worth while to attach an officer to Ride’s HQ who lives with the officers. …
When eyes are turned eastward we shall be grateful to have the foundations of an intelligence organisation in being in China. At the present moment, the Americans require it and General Chennault has expressed himself as most grateful for what is provided by the BAAG, and regards the BAAG as his only source of information in the Hongkong - Waichow areas. …”
NA FO 371/46197
C in C India (2.5.45) [Field Marshal Auchinleck]
“… HMG are vitally interested in use of BAAG following recapture of Hongkong …”